

## The Criminal Justice and War Model in Understanding Counterterrorism in Pakistan

Muhammad Riaz Shad\*

Sajid Iqbal\*\*

### **Abstract**

*The US intervention in Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks brought about adverse socio-political and economic consequences for Pakistan. Pakistan's decision to support the US intervention in Afghanistan turned some forces in the former FATA to militancy which resulted in hundreds of terrorist attacks in various parts of Pakistan. While Pakistan adopted various counter-terrorism strategies, the terrorist attack on Peshawar Army Public School on December 16, 2014, drove it to take up a proactive and comprehensive strategy. National Action Plan (NAP), adopted with a national consensus, was the manifestation of this strategy. The NAP for the most part aimed at stopping the activities of banned terrorist groups, bringing the madrasahs (religious seminaries) under an orderly system, countering the terrorist financing, and the trial of terrorists in the military courts. In practice, however, Pakistan turned more to the war model, with intensification and expansion of military operations, and least to the criminal justice model in the fight against terrorism. The then government provided a constitutional cover for counterterrorism military actions by adopting the 21<sup>st</sup> amendment on January 6, 2015. In consequence, the terrorist incidents have massively decreased but there is little evidence that the NAP has achieved a long-lasting success. This argument builds on the fact that Pakistan's efforts to assume key reforms promised in the NAP, particularly about Madrassas and the Criminal Justice System CJS remain Lack luster. This paper emphasizes the importance of the CJS in fighting terrorism more effectively. It argues that Pakistan can achieve the counterterrorism objective of the National Action Plan on a sustainable basis only if it reforms and strengthens the current CJS as envisaged.*

**Keywords:** Counterterrorism, Military Courts, National Action Plan, War Model, Criminal Justice Model

---

\*Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, National University of Modern Languages (NUML), Islamabad.

Email: [mrshad@numl.edu.pk](mailto:mrshad@numl.edu.pk)

\*\*PhD Scholar, Department of International Relations, National University of Modern Languages (NUML), Islamabad.

Email: [iqbalian07@gmail.com](mailto:iqbalian07@gmail.com)

## **Introduction**

Pakistan has been struggling against terrorism since the US-led NATO intervention in Afghanistan. Its decision to support and facilitate the NATO operations in Afghanistan against Al-Qaida and Taliban caused militant groups' wrath against the country. Several militant organizations committed hundreds of terrorist attacks in Pakistan, but the attack on Peshawar Army Public School on December 16, 2014, was the most tragic as it took the lives of nearly one hundred and fifty children and few teachers. The attack prompted not only an accelerated counterterrorism campaign but also a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy as embodied in the National Action Plan (NAP) (Sahill, 2018).

The massive public reaction towards the Peshawar school incident provided an opportunity for the government to adopt the NAP in January 2015. The NAP reinforced the implementation of existing laws more effectively and sought the removal of the constitutional barriers to tackle the menace of terrorism in the country (Hussain, 2018). Its major law enforcement measures included actions to stop banned jihadist groups activities, bring the Madrassas under a more regulated system and choke terror financing. Moreover, the NAP provided for the establishment of military courts to try criminals involved in terrorism through parliamentary approval as a legal cover. This provision clearly undermined the constitutional principle of separation of powers between executive and judiciary. In addition, the empowerment of the security forces and the establishment of the military courts tended to restrict/violate basic human rights (Hassan & Sabaruddin, 2019).

A comprehensive counterterrorism strategy as reflected in the NAP was a much-desired and much-needed initiative. However, in practice, Pakistan relied more on the war model with expedition and expansion of the on-going military operations. Parliament of Pakistan passed the 21<sup>st</sup> amendment to the constitution in January 2015 to set up military courts for speedy trial of terrorism-related offences for a period of two years. The government paid less attention to the criminal justice model in combating terrorism. While the military offensives have resulted in an obvious control over terrorism in Pakistan, reforms aimed at the improvement of governance effectiveness, particularly law enforcement, have been undertaken half-heartedly (Hassan & Sabaruddin, 2019). Some banned organizations are working under different names in Pakistan. The reformation program of Madrassa system is still facing difficulties. National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) remains a weak institution, unable to meet its mandated targets.

This paper highlights the importance of the CJS in combating terrorism. It argues that the NAP's objective of counterterrorism can be achieved more effectively if the existing weak CJS of Pakistan is reformed and strengthened. The existing

militarized counterterrorism strategy led by the armed forces of Pakistan should be shifted to an effective CJS championed by the civilian law enforcement agencies. Civil law enforcement agencies—police, prosecution and judiciary—need to be reformed and empowered to tackle the present-day challenge of terrorism.

### **Questions**

1. How is the criminal justice model (in)effective in countering terrorism in Pakistan?
2. How should the current CJS of Pakistan be reformed?

### **Hypothesis**

Peace will remain elusive, specifically in ex-FATA and generally in Pakistan, unless a reformed and empowered criminal justice model replaces the existing war model with an aim to treat the terrorist criminals in accordance with the rule of law and fight terrorism with a proactive strategy.

### **Literature Review**

James J. Saulino (2011) examines four legal models for Pakistan's counterterrorism strategy: the local prosecution, international extradition, rendition and direct action. In the first model, he focuses on the existing tools available in Pakistan's constitution and law for counterterrorism. The second model is about the trial of criminals and terrorists arrested in Pakistan elsewhere in the world following an extradition process. In the third model, a terrorist can be handed over to the US if there is a fear of escape from prisons in Pakistan. At the same time, the criminals on the wanted list of the US should be rendered to it. In the final model, the terrorists in Pakistan should directly be targeted by the US using drone technology. Finally, Saulino draws attention to Pakistan's numerous weaknesses to meet the necessary conditions for counter terrorism.

Jason Rineheart (2010) maintains that the traditionally used two main approaches, the 'War Model' and the 'Criminal Justice Model,' against terrorism are no more effective. It is necessary to design a new model to combat terrorism in the current scenario. He recommends replacing traditional strategies with global or modern strategies to combat terrorism. Countries alone cannot fight terrorism effectively as the terrorist organizations have grown and become multinational in ideological as well as operational terms. In such circumstances, it is necessary to forge a global strategy centered on global cooperation against terrorism. He emphasizes the formulation of a universally accepted anti-terrorism approach involving inter-state cooperation across the world in terms of sharing intelligence information and coordinating combat operations.

Saba Noor (2008) looks into the history of laws related to counterterrorism in Pakistan. Formulation of anti-terrorism laws began in Pakistan in 1949 with the implementation of the law on 'Public and Representative Office Disqualification Act (PRODA),' meant to address political violence. Though PRODA was the first legislation of its kind, the term 'terrorism' was not used. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, for the first time, injected the word "terrorist activities" into the law. A serious shortcoming of these initiatives was that most of the laws were adopted without much regard to the parliament. This is why these laws were flexible and modified by the successive governments according to their own stakes. At present, Pakistan's anti-terrorism legislation includes almost all aspects of dealing with terrorism, but the problem lies in its implementation.

Robert Perito and Tariq Parvez (2014) describe the role of Pakistani police in the anti-terrorism efforts. Police stations in Pakistan have not been able to effectively cope with the challenge of terrorism because they are poorly equipped. Pakistani police can play an effective role if it is trained to develop operational procedures of organizational standards. Police stations need to be well equipped, particularly with information technologies. The only way forward to secure people from attacks by criminals and terrorists is to modernize and reform the country's police.

Muhammad Feyyaz (2015) points out deficiencies in anti-terrorism policies of Pakistan. He argues that there is still no consensus among the political elite in Pakistan as to how deal with the problem of terrorism. Consequently, they have left all the task of formulation and implementation of anti-terrorism policies on the shoulders of the army leadership. In addition, he points out that the absence of consensus among political leaders is not the only problem; there is a coordination gap between military and civilian law enforcement agencies to combat terrorism in the country. This hampers the success and sustainability of anti-terrorism operations. The author emphasizes a wider political consensus and an institutional mechanism for inter-agency coordination for an effective counterterrorism approach.

Crises Group Asia Report (2015) explains that the Army Public School (APS) Peshawar incident did not much change Pakistan's anti-terrorist approach, except that it adopted a targeted national action plan. Significantly, the government decided to put the implementation of NAP on a fast track. The report critically evaluates the legality and effectiveness of the NAP. It maintains that there is no problem with the objectives of the NAP, but its reliance on the use of lethal force to combat terrorism is a matter of great concern. The report calls it the 'draconian legislation' on counterterrorism. This type of anti-terrorism approach deprives citizens of their fundamental human rights. Moreover, long-term peace in ex-FATA is not possible through force. The report

suggests that structural reforms are immediately needed to eradicate terrorism and extremism in the country.

Most social commentators have argued in much the same way that Pakistan's anti-terrorism policies are deficient in many aspects. The country lacks the formulation of new laws and, more importantly, the implementation of the existing laws. The use of military force or the 'War Model' is partially justified by some socio-political analysts, but majority is against the blind use of force in the fight against terrorism for a long period. The use of unconstitutional lethal methods to counter-terrorism for a long time tends to annoy the public and can turn people to empathize with extremist groups. Above all, this highlights the abuse of basic human rights tarnishing image of the country internationally.

After the attack on APS Peshawar, the government should have done a well thought-out evaluation of the flaws and weaknesses of its anti-terrorism strategy. Policy makers should have realized the need of gearing the efforts and resources towards improving intelligence and investigative techniques to prevent terrorist incidents in future, rather than relying merely on the blunt instruments of 'War Model.' It is argued here that an enduring way to fight terrorism is to upgrade the CJS and build capacity of civil security agencies, especially the police. Moreover, mainstreaming of the former FATA region through its socio-political and economic integration with the KPK province is vital to address the root causes of terrorism.

### **Conceptual Framework**

A well-defined debate has been taking place in Pakistan regarding two counterterrorism models, namely the 'War Model' and the 'Criminal Justice Model' (Braithwaite, 2002). The 'War Model' frames the use of military force in the fight against terrorism, while the 'Criminal Justice Model' confines the counterterrorism measures within the rule of law and democratic values. The latter model is against the blind use of military force in the fight against terrorism. In democratic societies, effective anti-terrorism strategies must include a well-established CJS under a legal framework and rule of law. Punishment for perpetrators of terrorism should follow due criminal justice process under a fair legal mechanism to ensure that it does not infringe the basic human rights. Because almost all UN member countries are signatories of the universal declaration on human rights (UDHR), which ensures citizens a right to fair trial. Donnelly, J., & Whelan (2017) in *Human Rights and the War on Terror* presented many instances of human rights violations with respect to war on terror in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In the contemporary era, terrorism has become a complex phenomenon, characterized by networks of motivations, recruitments, financing and operations. This necessitates the need for a comprehensive and law-based strategy to counter the present-

day challenges of terrorism. An anti-terrorism strategy based on the CJS further helps to avoid violence and coercive means, guaranteeing the rule of law and the protection of human rights (Ashworth, 2002).

As far as Pakistan's counter-terrorism strategy is concerned, the country has been relying on the War Model as evident by the predominance of military operations against terrorism, particularly Operation Zarb-e-Azb since June 2014. Following the terrorist attack on the Peshawar Army Public School, Pakistan has resorted even more to the instrument of coercion and military force. Contrarily, this paper underscores the importance of the Criminal Justice Model in fight against terrorism in Pakistan. It builds on the argument that force is not the solution to long-term problems; in fact, its continuous use leads to complicated security problems.

### **Evolution of Pakistan's Counterterrorism Strategy**

In October 2001, the US began a military mission in Afghanistan to eradicate Al-Qaeda and the associated terrorist groups backed by the Taliban. The Pakistani government had to take a strategic decision about its role in the US-led war on terror in Afghanistan. General Musharraf, then chief executive of the country, decided to provide logistical support to the US forces, forsaking the erstwhile support to the Taliban regime (Yamin, 2015). Pakistan's support for the US forces was a strategic compulsion but not without a cost. Some Tribal people in the Ex-FATA region of Pakistan were loyal to the Afghan Taliban and were not happy with this decision. The former FATA, bearing a difficult geography, provided safe havens to the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda elements who crossed into the tribal region of Pakistan to hide themselves from the US bombardment in Afghanistan (Ahmad, 2008). Now, the US pressured Pakistan to take military action against them and later launched direct drone strikes in the region. These developments provoked an extreme reaction from the Ex-FATA residents, posing serious security threat to Pakistan. The Pakistani Taliban under the name of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) started massive terrorist activities targeting urban areas of Pakistan from 2007 onward. They developed alliances with other militant organizations in Pakistan to expand their support base and terrorist activities in other parts of the country.

As the terrorist attacks increased, Pakistan felt the need to have an effective strategy to fight terrorism. The country has been employing both hard (military) and soft (non-military) options as part of its anti-terrorism strategy. However, the non-military option has remained much less exercised compared to the military option. In recent past, Pakistan has used force to fight terrorism in Karachi and Waziristan. Rangers and intelligence agencies heavily led the operation in Karachi while the civilian institutions got the least role in decision making as well as execution of operations.

Sindh government and Sindh police remained mostly marginalized in the operations review meetings taking place at the Rangers headquarters. Sindh Chief Minister repeatedly expressed concerns for having only a nominal role in dealing with Karachi's security situation (Shah, 2015). Moreover, extrajudicial executions committed by the law enforcement agencies were a common practice as reported by media (Waseem, 2019).

The Pakistani government further intensified the use of force against the terrorists after the Peshawar school incident on December 16, 2014. After this attack, the government also decided to establish special trial courts under Army to decide the terrorist cases. Initially set up for two years, these special military courts are still functioning. The decision to set up and later extend the military courts was taken on the basis that the existing CJS lacked capacity to deal with the terrorist cases. Simultaneously, it was decided that the CJS of the country would be revamped and reformed. Unfortunately, this promise remains unfulfilled yet (Zubair, 2019).

The military courts do contain a clause that grants the right to legal defense, but secret trials outside the information of public and media can lead to manipulated convictions and the right to legal defense in name only. The military courts are empowered to arrest, judge and execute anyone accused of terrorist activity. Appeal against the decision of a military court can be registered, but a high-ranking military officer chairs the court of appeal (Hassan & Sabaruddin, 2019). In such circumstances, a fair trial in military courts, particularly in comparison with the civilian courts, is difficult to achieve.

### **Structural Problems of Criminal Justice System**

Notwithstanding the human rights concerns about the military courts, it is obvious that the establishment of military courts has resulted from the failure of the existing CJS in Pakistan. Both people and institutions in Pakistan are not satisfied with the justice system of the country. This dissatisfaction is evident from an insignificant criticism of military courts on part of public (Ghori, 2018). Generally, many Pakistani citizens appreciate Pakistan's military operations against terrorists in Waziristan (Ghori, 2018). Nevertheless, this does not justify the establishment or extension of the military courts. The government needs to update the CJS priority basis to ensure fair and rapid trials in the civilian courts. The Pakistani government and security establishment should have realized the flaws in counterterrorism strategy after the Peshawar school attack, rather than more relying on the use of military force. A coercive approach to counterterrorism is like cutting leaves, branches and even the stem of an unwanted tree in the backyard of the house but keeping the roots intact.

An enduring solution to the issue of terrorism in Pakistan is a transparent judicial system. The conviction of an accused will have far-reaching effects in terms of socio-political and military fight against terrorism if people have confidence in the legitimacy and transparency of the judicial system. Pakistan's current CJS requires reforms to improve the capacity of the civil law enforcement institutions, particularly the police. Another important factor in fighting terrorism is to practically bring regions like FATA under the law of the country. Although the region is now constitutionally integrated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, implementation seems patchy. The delay in the inclusion of the FATA region into mainstream governance system results in the longevity of the Military model in counter terrorism efforts. It is indeed challenging to introduce modern police, courts and administrative systems to a region that remained under a unique traditional governance system for more than two centuries.

An important initiative to reform the current CJS was the adoption of National Action Plan (PAN), which promised necessary legislation in this regard. While NAP adopts a balanced approach in using force and taking administrative measures to address the issue of terrorism, it has some flaws. Foremost, it neglects the need of building police capacity in fighting terrorism (Sahill, 2018). Rather, it provides for a dedicated counter-terrorism force. A specialized force is desirable, but it cannot replace the role of police in fighting terrorism. Given its countrywide presence and knowledge of people at the grassroots level, police can play an effective role in the fight against terrorism provided it is well equipped and trained. Failure of the Criminal Justice Model to counterterrorism owes to structural and organizational weaknesses. Pakistan's CJS is widely criticized for being defective, exploitative and unfair. These weaknesses account for high crime rates in the country. A serious structural problem of the system is the abnormal delays in civil and criminal cases. There is a huge proportional difference between the total population and the courts/judges available in the country. Consequently, cases in the courts pile up resulting in not only serious delays but also corrupt practices and faulty decisions.

Another important structural weakness of Pakistan's CJS is its failure to effectively deal with the present-day challenges as it is rooted in outdated colonial laws. Pakistani legislature has seriously failed to adopt new laws meeting needs of the post-colonial state. Many of Pakistan's criminal and civil prosecution laws are still based on the penal code of 1860. These old laws are technically inadequate to meet existing challenges. In addition, the Pakistani penal code is a puzzle in terms of technical language, which may result in monopolous interpretations by the lawyers and the judges.

Yet another important structural weakness of Pakistan's CJS is the lack of harmony between its various components. For example, the police stand as a very



important pillar of the CJS worldwide. However, the police are highly politicized in Pakistan and consequently the powerful uses it as a tool in pursuit of the vested interests. Therefore, instead of playing a positive role in the criminal investigation, the police operate at the behest of the political elite. The police department in Pakistan faces many structural problems that hinder its professional efficiency. Most serious problems are as under:

1. Lack of man power.
2. Deficiency of modern equipment such as weapons, technology and vehicles.
3. Low salaries
4. Influence of the political elite.

### **The Way Forward**

Pakistan has made some progress in improving the police. For instance, the number of police personnel since 2005 has increased from 220000 to 430000. However, only increase in the number without upgrading other prerequisites of performance is not sufficient (Hussain, Batool&Soroya, 2019). Professional training, merit, accountability and dedicated resources are required to obtain better results from the police department. The Punjab province has provided significant financial and technical assistance to the forensic science laboratory but the civil security agencies lack well-qualified personnel (Hussain, Batool&Soroya, 2019). While the federal and provincial governments have a commitment to combat terrorism using civil security agencies, the lack of adequate resources hampers the realization of their goal. There is need to impart modern professional training, amend the outdated laws and review the curriculum of the police department. There is no harm in consulting foreign experts in this regard.

Rehabilitation centres are established in prisons as an integral part of the CJS worldwide. These centres serve as the place where the convicted offenders are held for protecting the public from the harm they can cause and educate them for making them peaceful and productive part of the society. In Pakistan's case, prisons are poorly managed and, instead of rehabilitation, the criminals are further criminalized (Gull, 2018). Moreover, it is believed that the defendants while undergoing the court trial develop nefarious attitudes because of the improper treatment in prisons. These dark aspects of the CJS of Pakistan do not help overcome the challenges of crimes and terrorism. A perception prevails that many young people who participate in terrorist activities are victims of social injustice. Unfortunately, such people are not provided with rehabilitation services in prisons. Consequently, extremism and terrorism is the only way they know.

Pakistan's military claims that it has successfully fought terrorism in North Waziristan and parts of the Khyber Agency. However, the degree of this success needs to be verified by media and other independent observer organizations (Akhtar, 2019). The claims regarding the normalization of the security situation in ex-FATA are denied by the local political representatives. In addition, there is an apprehension that the militants in ex-FATA have hidden themselves to avoid the airstrikes. This has resulted in a slowdown of their terrorist operations, but this does not necessarily ensure that terrorism has been completely eradicated. The continuing attacks against the military personnel and key political figures indicate that some terrorist elements are still intact (Akhtar, 2019). Another criticism against the claims of military success in Waziristan is the longevity of the Zarb-e-Azb operation. Although the operation is considered as a significant success in the fight against terrorism, it is not seen as a tenable solution to the terrorist menace. The terrain of Waziristan is very complicated due to its mountainous nature. Therefore, it is perceived that the militants in Pakistan have temporarily crossed border into Afghanistan (Ahmad, 2018). They can reorganize as soon as the operation ends in the ex-FATA region. In short, the argument goes that the use of force is not a lasting solution for the issue of terrorism.

The best way to achieve durable peace in the former FATA is the implementation of FATA reforms aimed at mainstreaming the region. The modern district management framework should fully replace the customary administrative practices of the tribal belt. Fundamental rights of the residents, such as political participation, should be guaranteed as the top priority. Policymakers should focus on achieving the promised and much awaited reforms in the former FATA, rather than putting whole reliance on the military solution. The Parliament of Pakistan can play a key role in identifying flaws in the strategic approach to counterterrorism and recommending legal and political solutions to the problem. The constitutional development in Pakistan and subsequent power struggle between the civil and military authorities shows minimal role of the parliament in deciding strategic matters related to security of the country. A comparative stability in the transformation of democratic governments since 2008, provides an important opportunity to the democratic institutions (parliament) to play an important role in legislating an updated and effective Criminal Justice Laws.

## **Conclusion**

Pakistan can no longer afford to be an experimental laboratory to test different anti-terrorism strategies. Mere reliance on the use of force to eliminate the menace is not a viable policy. It does not provide a durable solution for the domestic security challenge of the country. There is an apprehension that if Pakistan continues with

coercive measures to fight terrorism, it will not be able to win hearts and minds of the common people against the perpetrators of terrorism. Pakistan has anti-terrorism laws for a long time, but its record in the implementation of these laws remains quite poor despite that the country has been suffering from the worst terrorist violence. Moreover, as the terrorist groups adopt advanced means to carry out their terrorist agenda, Pakistan needs to update its anti-terrorism laws. Framing new laws without reinforcing the implementation machinery, particularly the police, will not be a rewarding measure. The police, foremost, needs to be depoliticized and professionalized, and then it should have more resources for the implementation of laws.

To root out the terrorist networks in the country, the government must undertake long-term policies relating to law enforcement and socio-economic development instead of focusing on the military option as a whole time project. Due to the ethnic and sectarian reasons, some people in Pakistan have a soft corner for the extremist elements. Therefore, it is important to change the mindset of the people by addressing the root causes of terrorism and implementing the laws. To this end, it is vital to invest in education and social welfare of the people, particularly in the tribal areas. Along with this, policymakers should build the capacity of the CJS for trial and execution of terrorists. The CJS reforms should simultaneously focus on improving the operational capacity of the law enforcement agencies and ensuring the speedy trials of cases, including terrorist cases, in the civil courts.

## References

- Abbas, H. (2009). Police & Law Enforcement Reform in Pakistan: Crucial for Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Success. *Institute for Social Policy and Understanding*.
- Ahmad, N. (2014.) Pakistan's counter-terrorism strategy and its implications for domestic, regional and international security. *Fondation Maison des Sciences de l'homme*, Working Paper. Available at <http://www.fmsh.fr/en/dissemination/24613>
- Ahmad, S. (2018). Pakistan and International Principles in Conflict-Induced Internal Displacement, 2009-2015. *Pakistan Horizon*, 71(4), 61-80.
- Ahmed, S. (2015). "Pakistan's counter-terrorism policy 'a threat to democracy'." (G. D. Shams, Interviewer). Available at: <http://www.dw.com/en/pakistans-counter-terrorism-policy-a-threat-to-democracy/a-18603195>
- Akhtar, S. (2019). Decline of Insurgency in Pakistan's FATA: A Counterinsurgency Perspective. *Asian Survey*, 59(4), 693-716.
- Ashworth, A. (2002). Responsibilities, rights and restorative justice. *British Journal of Criminology*, 42(3), 578-595.
- Braithwaite, J. B. (2002). Thinking critically about the war model and the criminal justice model for combating terrorism. Available at SSRN 330500.
- Crises Group Asia Report. (2015). *Revisiting counterterrorism strategies in Pakistan: opportunities and pitfalls*. Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group.
- Donnelly, J., & Whelan, D. J. (2017). International human rights. Hachette UK.
- Feyyaz, Muhammad. (2015) "Why Pakistan Does Not Have a Counterterrorism Narrative." *Journal of Strategic Security*, 8(1), 63-78.
- Ghori, U. H. (2018). Military courts in Pakistan: A critical analysis. In *Global governance and regulation: Order and disorder in the 21st century* (pp. 261-277). Routledge.
- Gul, R. (2018). Our Prisons Punitive or Rehabilitative? An Analysis of Theory and Practice. *Policy Perspectives*, 15(3), 67-83.
- Hassan, M., & Bin Sabaruddin, J. S. (2019). Jurisdiction of Military Courts over Civilian Terrorists in Pakistan: A Miscarriage of Justice. *IIUM Law Journal*, 27(1), 63-88.
- Hussain, J. R. (2018). Risk, Pre-crime and Counterterrorism: Assessing Pakistan's Approach. *Global Politics Review*, 4(1), 59-66.
- Hussain, T., Batool, S. H., Soroya, S. H., & Warraich, N. F. (2019). Pakistani Prison Libraries: An Assessment of Services and Challenges. *Global Knowledge, Memory and Communication*, 68(1/2), 47-59.
- Jaspal, Z. N. (2008). WMD Terrorism and Pakistan: Counterterrorism. *Defense against Terrorism Review*, 1(2), 103-118.

- Khalid, I., & Naveed, A. (2014). Conflict in Waziristan. *South Asian Studies*, 29(2), 559-582).
- Khan, S. (2011). FATA political status: what are the consequences and options for Pakistan? *Strategic Insights*, 10(2), 30-36.
- Nawaz, S. (2011). Learning by Doing: The Pakistan Army's Experience with Counterinsurgency. *The Atlantic Council*. Available at <https://atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/transcript/transcript-learning-by-doing-the-pakistan-army-s-experience-with-counterinsurgency/>
- Noor, S. (2008). Evolution of Counter-Terrorism Legislation in Pakistan. *Conflict and Peace Studies*, 1(1), 87- 110.
- Parvez, R. P. (2014). *A Counterterrorism Role for Pakistan's Police Stations*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.
- Rashid, A. (2008). *Descent into chaos: the US and the failure of nation building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*. Penguin.
- Rineheart, J. (2010). Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. *Perspectives on terrorism*, 4(5), 31-45.
- Rodriguez, L. (2010). "Pakistani CJS proves no match for terrorism cases," *Los Angeles Times*. October 28. Available at: <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/28/world/la-fg-pakistan-acquittals-20101028>
- Sahill, P. H. (2018). The terror speaks: inside Pakistan's terrorism discourse and national action plan. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 41(4), 319-337.
- Saulino, J. J. (2011). Strategic Choices: Four Legal Models for Counterterrorism in Pakistan. *Harvard National Security Journal*, 2, 248-282.
- Shafqat, S. (2011). Saving Pakistan: Devising an Agenda for Counter-Terrorism Strategy. *Centre for Public Policy and Governance*. Available at: <http://cppg.fccollege.edu.pk/saving-pakistan-devising-an-agenda-for-counter-terrorism-strategy/>
- United Nations. (2009). *Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism*. New York: United Nations publications.
- Vestenskov, D., & Syed, M. H. (2015). *Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism: Sharing Experiences in Afghanistan and Pakistan*. Denmark: Institut for Strategi, Forsvarsakademiet.
- Waseem, Z. (2019). 'Brothers in arms'? A police-paramilitary partnership in Karachi. *Policing and Society*, 1-17.
- Yamin, T. (2015). Examining Pakistan's Strategic Decision to Support the US War on Terror. *Strategic Studies*, 35(2), 113-135.
- Zeb, K., & Ahmed, Z. S. (2019). Structural Violence and Terrorism in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. *Civil Wars*, 21(1), 1-24.

Zubair, M., Why Pakistan should not renew mandate of military courts to try terrorism suspects. *CONSTITUTIONNET*. Available at:

<http://constitutionnet.org/news/why-pakistan-should-not-renew-mandate-military-courts-try-terrorism-suspects>